I can see how some people would be less than fully persuaded by the evidence Colin Powell  presented at the United Nations.  But for my part,  I find it credible.

For example, maybe all we were shown is artists' impressions of the chemical weapons development trucks, but what else could we plausibly expect to see?  A photograph taken from anywhere outside such a truck would reveal nothing:  all we'd see is a nondescript vehicle, which could as well be carrying boots or pomegranates or yoyos.  As for seeing photographs of the insides, let's get serious.  How in the world is anybody going to get away with taking snapshots in there?  For starters, what  would they tell the others in the truck?  "Oh, I'm just taking pictures of the office to show my kids where their daddy works?"

On balance, it probably requires more of a suspension of disbelief to regard the artist's renderings as fabrications than to accept them as plausible.  A fair number of people--all American citizens and credible sources--would know for sure whether or not such trucks exist.  If the story were a fabrication, all it would take is one of these people deciding he had a duty to prevent the world from being hoodwinked into war, and believing this duty counted for more than his secrecy oath or his career aspirations, and after an anonymous phone call or two to the press, a process would be set in motion that could easily end up bringing down a Presidency.

George W. Bush may be a little on the impatient side, but I doubt he's rash and foolhardy enough to risk that.

And what about Colin Powell?  He's the original Mr. Careful.  I can see no way on earth he'd risk his reputation on a charge he hadn't satisfied himself was thoroughly verified.

That's why, on balance, the explanation I find the most plausible is simply that detailed descriptions were provided by someone who had worked in those trucks, and then an artist was brought in to depict what had been described.

Of course, not every bit of evidence presented was terribly impressive.  Personally, I was struck by the weakness of the opening telephone conversation, involving a discussion of the chance that some sort of nonstandard vehicle would be discovered.   It wasn't hard to imagine a number of situations having nothing to do with illicit weapons in which those same words could have been spoken.  With all the personnel and all the equipment the NSA has at its disposal, was this the best they could get?

But bit by bit, the evidence accumulated and began to develop into a pattern.  The phone conversation where a senior military officer told a junior one to delete all mentions of nerve gas was considerably more compelling than the one about the nonstandard vehicle.  So were the satellite photographs showing a convoy of trucks pulling up at a suspect site and leaving it just before the U.N. inspectors arrived.  And how about the building that was demolished, with all of its debris and even all the topsoil around it carted off?  Why would anybody do that, unless they had something significant to hide?

Now I'll admit, I didn't see all of Powell's presentation.  When I'd seen enough to conclude that Saddam Hussein has some really nasty stuff in his arsenal, whether or not it includes anything of a nuclear nature, and that he's playing an elaborate game of footsy with the inspectors, I turned the TV off and got back to the work I had to do.  Maybe I'd feel more skeptical if I'd seen what he presented on nuclear weapons and potential links to al Qaeda.   But at this point, that's pretty much just speculation.

For me, the issue at this point isn't what Hussein has, it's how we're going to react to it. 

I can understand those who don't want to risk some form of catastrophic collateral damage in an attempt to remove him from the scene.  But I can also understand those who say that, as unpleasant and risk-prone as such an action may be, it's a chore better faced up to early than postponed.  

Saddam Hussein's large and apparently growing arsenal of chemical and biological weapons is in itself cause for significant concern--no matter what he may or may not have been able to achieve to date in the nuclear realm.  If a proposed policy fails to deal squarely and credibly with this arsenal and what we should do about it, it's hard to how see how  such a policy can be regarded as well-considered.